Civil society has become an indispensable part of the global discourses on democratization, good governance, sustainable development, and security. Differing perspectives view civil society as a legitimizing actor, a critical partner, and even a serious challenger in these discourses. This paper examines the ways in which civil society actions contribute to Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R) and Sustainable Development Goal-16 (SDG-16). It argues that civil society’s ability to make significant contributions to SSG/R and SDG-16 rests on the interplay between endogenous factors such as its plurality, robustness, and civility and exogenous variables such as the regime type, state capacity, and relations with security providers. The differing combinations of these factors enable civil society to perform three major roles: (1) an agent of democratic accountability and civilian oversight; (2) a space for new discourses on security and development; and (3) an alternative provider of people-oriented security. This paper uses case studies of the Philippines, Tunisia, and Somalia, among others, to show the variation in the performance of these roles, the gains achieved by civil society organizations (CSOs), and the limitations and challenges posed by their involvement. It argues that efforts of civil society to improve SSG help meet some of the targets of SDG-16 that relate to improving accountability, transparency, and participation. This paper concludes by examining the implications of civil society’s participation in the future sustainability of SSG/R as a framework and the progress toward the realization of SDG-16 and providing viable policy recommendations for actors at the international, state, and societal levels.
Civil society has become an indispensable part of the global discourses on democratization, good governance, sustainable development, and security. Differing perspectives view civil society as a legitimizing actor, a critical partner, and even a serious challenger in these discourses. This paper examines the ways in which civil society actions contribute to Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R) and Sustainable Development Goal-16 (SDG-16). It argues that civil society’s ability to make significant contributions to SSG/R and SDG-16 rests on the interplay between endogenous factors such as its plurality, robustness, and civility and exogenous variables such as the regime type, state capacity, and relations with security providers. The differing combinations of these factors enable civil society to perform three major roles: (1) an agent of democratic accountability and civilian oversight; (2) a space for new discourses on security and development; and (3) an alternative provider of people-oriented security. This paper uses case studies of the Philippines, Tunisia, and Somalia, among others, to show the variation in the performance of these roles, the gains achieved by civil society organizations (CSOs), and the limitations and challenges posed by their involvement. It argues that efforts of civil society to improve SSG help meet some of the targets of SDG-16 that relate to improving accountability, transparency, and participation. This paper concludes by examining the implications of civil society’s participation in the future sustainability of SSG/R as a framework and the progress toward the realization of SDG-16 and providing viable policy recommendations for actors at the international, state, and societal levels.
Civil society has become an indispensable part of the global discourses on democratization, good governance, sustainable development, and security. Differing perspectives view civil society as a legitimizing actor, a critical partner, and even a serious challenger in these discourses. This paper examines the ways in which civil society actions contribute to Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R) and Sustainable Development Goal-16 (SDG-16). It argues that civil society’s ability to make significant contributions to SSG/R and SDG-16 rests on the interplay between endogenous factors such as its plurality, robustness, and civility and exogenous variables such as the regime type, state capacity, and relations with security providers. The differing combinations of these factors enable civil society to perform three major roles: (1) an agent of democratic accountability and civilian oversight; (2) a space for new discourses on security and development; and (3) an alternative provider of people-oriented security. This paper uses case studies of the Philippines, Tunisia, and Somalia, among others, to show the variation in the performance of these roles, the gains achieved by civil society organizations (CSOs), and the limitations and challenges posed by their involvement. It argues that efforts of civil society to improve SSG help meet some of the targets of SDG-16 that relate to improving accountability, transparency, and participation. This paper concludes by examining the implications of civil society’s participation in the future sustainability of SSG/R as a framework and the progress toward the realization of SDG-16 and providing viable policy recommendations for actors at the international, state, and societal levels.
This is an open-access work Uses econometric analysis showcasing criticality of epidemiological environment in determining calorie consumption Presents a blend of analytical methods, rooted in economics with inter-disciplinary approach, towards achieving SDG2 Showcases linkages between SDG2 and other SDGs, in particular SDG1 and SDG5
Ten years ago, in 2011, the FuturICT project was selected as the No. 1 European flagship pilot in the area of future and emerging technologies. Its goal was to understand and manage complex, global and socially interactive systems, focusing on sustainability and resilience. By integrating Information and Communication Technology (ICT), complexity science and social sciences, it intended to promote a paradigm shift towards a symbiotic co-evolution of ICT and society. Leveraging data from complex, global ICT systems would enable the development of models of techno-socio-economic systems. In turn, insights from these models would shape a new generation of socially adaptive, self-organized ICT systems.
How does the nexus between security, human rights and good governance play out in the sustainable development context? Based on state-of-the-field, interdisciplinary research with a global perspective, Leaving no one behind, leaving no one unaccountable offers the first comprehensive account of the role of ombuds institutions in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, launched by the United Nations in 2015. With their unique position in-between three branches of power, the mandate to oversee public administration (including the security sector) and protect human rights, ombuds institutions are well-placed to play an important role in national efforts to fulfil the SDGs. The book takes the specific angle by looking at SDG-16, devoted to effective, accountable and inclusive institutions, through the lens of security sector governance.
It brings granular analysis of all SDG 16 targets, demonstrating how ombuds institutions could contribute to achieving each of them. The book develops an innovative conceptual framework, by looking at both implementation and accountability. The former is captured under the title of ‘leaving no one behind’ and the latter under ‘leaving no one unaccountable’. Leaving no one behind is a central credo of the 2030 Agenda. It is highly relevant for SDG-16, as well as security sector governance, due to the centrality of the principles of responsiveness, inclusiveness and participation.
The book attests that for a number of the SDG 16 targets, ombuds institutions should primarily serve as accountability mechanisms. It argues they should work with, pressure, and make public administration accountable, in cases when the administration as the primary duty-bearer fails to protect the rights of citizens and when their actions fall short of the standards needed to achieve the SDGs.
As this book demonstrates, many SDG 16 targets are rather vague, and limited guidance exists on how to measure and achieve them, especially in fragile contexts. It thus provides guidance and recommendations to ombuds institutions and other actors on how to best support each other in achieving SDG-16. Leaving no one behind, leaving no one unaccountable is a key resource for scholars, policymakers and activists concerned with effective, accountable and inclusive institutions, and those interested in political science, security studies, human rights and development studies.
How does the nexus between security, human rights and good governance play out in the sustainable development context? Based on state-of-the-field, interdisciplinary research with a global perspective, Leaving no one behind, leaving no one unaccountable offers the first comprehensive account of the role of ombuds institutions in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, launched by the United Nations in 2015. With their unique position in-between three branches of power, the mandate to oversee public administration (including the security sector) and protect human rights, ombuds institutions are well-placed to play an important role in national efforts to fulfil the SDGs. The book takes the specific angle by looking at SDG-16, devoted to effective, accountable and inclusive institutions, through the lens of security sector governance.
It brings granular analysis of all SDG 16 targets, demonstrating how ombuds institutions could contribute to achieving each of them. The book develops an innovative conceptual framework, by looking at both implementation and accountability. The former is captured under the title of ‘leaving no one behind’ and the latter under ‘leaving no one unaccountable’. Leaving no one behind is a central credo of the 2030 Agenda. It is highly relevant for SDG-16, as well as security sector governance, due to the centrality of the principles of responsiveness, inclusiveness and participation.
The book attests that for a number of the SDG 16 targets, ombuds institutions should primarily serve as accountability mechanisms. It argues they should work with, pressure, and make public administration accountable, in cases when the administration as the primary duty-bearer fails to protect the rights of citizens and when their actions fall short of the standards needed to achieve the SDGs.
As this book demonstrates, many SDG 16 targets are rather vague, and limited guidance exists on how to measure and achieve them, especially in fragile contexts. It thus provides guidance and recommendations to ombuds institutions and other actors on how to best support each other in achieving SDG-16. Leaving no one behind, leaving no one unaccountable is a key resource for scholars, policymakers and activists concerned with effective, accountable and inclusive institutions, and those interested in political science, security studies, human rights and development studies.
How does the nexus between security, human rights and good governance play out in the sustainable development context? Based on state-of-the-field, interdisciplinary research with a global perspective, Leaving no one behind, leaving no one unaccountable offers the first comprehensive account of the role of ombuds institutions in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, launched by the United Nations in 2015. With their unique position in-between three branches of power, the mandate to oversee public administration (including the security sector) and protect human rights, ombuds institutions are well-placed to play an important role in national efforts to fulfil the SDGs. The book takes the specific angle by looking at SDG-16, devoted to effective, accountable and inclusive institutions, through the lens of security sector governance.
It brings granular analysis of all SDG 16 targets, demonstrating how ombuds institutions could contribute to achieving each of them. The book develops an innovative conceptual framework, by looking at both implementation and accountability. The former is captured under the title of ‘leaving no one behind’ and the latter under ‘leaving no one unaccountable’. Leaving no one behind is a central credo of the 2030 Agenda. It is highly relevant for SDG-16, as well as security sector governance, due to the centrality of the principles of responsiveness, inclusiveness and participation.
The book attests that for a number of the SDG 16 targets, ombuds institutions should primarily serve as accountability mechanisms. It argues they should work with, pressure, and make public administration accountable, in cases when the administration as the primary duty-bearer fails to protect the rights of citizens and when their actions fall short of the standards needed to achieve the SDGs.
As this book demonstrates, many SDG 16 targets are rather vague, and limited guidance exists on how to measure and achieve them, especially in fragile contexts. It thus provides guidance and recommendations to ombuds institutions and other actors on how to best support each other in achieving SDG-16. Leaving no one behind, leaving no one unaccountable is a key resource for scholars, policymakers and activists concerned with effective, accountable and inclusive institutions, and those interested in political science, security studies, human rights and development studies.
The United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 calls for the establishment of peaceful, just and inclusive societies. The security sector has the potential to contribute to SDG16 through the fulfilment of its traditional and non-traditional security tasks. However, the security sector can also detract from SDG16 when it acts outside the confines of the law. Good governance of the sector is therefore a prerequisite to achieving SDG16, and parliaments can make an important contribution to accountability and good governance. Parliaments contribute to both transparency and accountability of the sector through their various functions and act as a counterweight to executive dominance, including in the executive’s use of security forces. Yet, in times of crisis, states run a risk of executive dominance and executives are often quick to resort to the use of the security sector to address an array of challenges. This risk also emerged during the global Covid-19 pandemic where states used the security sector, notably the military and police, in various ways to respond to the pandemic. This study reviewed the utilisation of the security sector in South Africa, the Philippines and the UK during the first year of the Covid-19 outbreak, resulting in varied outcomes ranging from positive humanitarian contributions to misconduct and brutality that led to the death of citizens. The initial lockdowns in these countries constrained parliamentary activity, resulting in a lack of adequate parliamentary oversight of security sector utilisation when it was most needed. Parliaments did recover oversight of the sector to varied degrees, but often with limited depth of inquiry into the Covid-19 deployments. To prevent the security sector from detracting from SDG16, the study identified a need for a rapid parliamentary reaction capability to security sector utilisation, especially in cases of extraordinary deployments coupled with an elevated risk of executive dominance.
The United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 calls for the establishment of peaceful, just and inclusive societies. The security sector has the potential to contribute to SDG16 through the fulfilment of its traditional and non-traditional security tasks. However, the security sector can also detract from SDG16 when it acts outside the confines of the law. Good governance of the sector is therefore a prerequisite to achieving SDG16, and parliaments can make an important contribution to accountability and good governance. Parliaments contribute to both transparency and accountability of the sector through their various functions and act as a counterweight to executive dominance, including in the executive’s use of security forces. Yet, in times of crisis, states run a risk of executive dominance and executives are often quick to resort to the use of the security sector to address an array of challenges. This risk also emerged during the global Covid-19 pandemic where states used the security sector, notably the military and police, in various ways to respond to the pandemic. This study reviewed the utilisation of the security sector in South Africa, the Philippines and the UK during the first year of the Covid-19 outbreak, resulting in varied outcomes ranging from positive humanitarian contributions to misconduct and brutality that led to the death of citizens. The initial lockdowns in these countries constrained parliamentary activity, resulting in a lack of adequate parliamentary oversight of security sector utilisation when it was most needed. Parliaments did recover oversight of the sector to varied degrees, but often with limited depth of inquiry into the Covid-19 deployments. To prevent the security sector from detracting from SDG16, the study identified a need for a rapid parliamentary reaction capability to security sector utilisation, especially in cases of extraordinary deployments coupled with an elevated risk of executive dominance.
The United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 calls for the establishment of peaceful, just and inclusive societies. The security sector has the potential to contribute to SDG16 through the fulfilment of its traditional and non-traditional security tasks. However, the security sector can also detract from SDG16 when it acts outside the confines of the law. Good governance of the sector is therefore a prerequisite to achieving SDG16, and parliaments can make an important contribution to accountability and good governance. Parliaments contribute to both transparency and accountability of the sector through their various functions and act as a counterweight to executive dominance, including in the executive’s use of security forces. Yet, in times of crisis, states run a risk of executive dominance and executives are often quick to resort to the use of the security sector to address an array of challenges. This risk also emerged during the global Covid-19 pandemic where states used the security sector, notably the military and police, in various ways to respond to the pandemic. This study reviewed the utilisation of the security sector in South Africa, the Philippines and the UK during the first year of the Covid-19 outbreak, resulting in varied outcomes ranging from positive humanitarian contributions to misconduct and brutality that led to the death of citizens. The initial lockdowns in these countries constrained parliamentary activity, resulting in a lack of adequate parliamentary oversight of security sector utilisation when it was most needed. Parliaments did recover oversight of the sector to varied degrees, but often with limited depth of inquiry into the Covid-19 deployments. To prevent the security sector from detracting from SDG16, the study identified a need for a rapid parliamentary reaction capability to security sector utilisation, especially in cases of extraordinary deployments coupled with an elevated risk of executive dominance.